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the rights of mineral owners in the exploration and production of badly
needed domestic energy resources. The decision, however, is questionable
in the light of the safeguards provided by the new reclamation statute.
Furthermore, title to minerals under a grant or reservation continues to
remain uncertain in the absence of specific language in the instrument."0
Rather than vesting title to near-surface substances in the surface owner,
as advocated in Reed, the mineral owner should obtain title to all minerals
and his right to remove them should be regulated to prevent surface destruction." Furthermore, legislation should be enacted requiring that the
mineral owner compensate the surface owner in damages for loss of surface
use during the period of mining and reclamation. Reed's significance lies
in its demonstration of the court's willingness to sacrifice stability and
certainty in land titles in an effort to protect the surface estate from temporary impairment due to surface mining. This policy does not favor the
production of energy resources, and whether it will endure subsequent
decisions remains to be seen.
Peter H. Carroll, III
VENUE-Guaranty Contracts-One Who Unconditionally
and Absolutely Guarantees Payment Of a Note Is
Bound By Its Terms, Including Its Venue
Provisions
Hopkins v. First National Bank,
551 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1977) (per curiam)*
Burtram C. Hopkins and others entered into a contract which absolutely
and unconditionally guaranteed payment of a corporation's promissory
note to a bank. Alleging that the note was past due, the bank sued the
corporate maker and the guarantors.' The suit was brought in the county
70. See 6 WEST'S TEXAS FORMS § 1.2(5)(B), at 7 (1977) (grant or reservation of minerals
should expressly provide for substances that would cause surface destruction upon extraction).
71. See Comment, Is Coal Included in a Grant or Reservation of "Oil, Gas, or Other

Minerals?", 30 Sw. L.J. 481, 504 (1976).
* In a memorandum opinion the Texas Supreme Court found no reversible error and
refused the writ from the court of civil appeals. The opinion of the court of civil appeals may
be found at 546 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam,

551 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1977).

1. The note sued upon was a renewal of a prior note. The guaranty, executed at the time
of the original note, provided that the bank may "extend or renew ... any of the Liabilities."
Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 546 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976), writ
ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 551 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1977).
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where the note was expressly made payable. Hopkins filed a plea of privilege to be sued in the county of his domicile. In its controverting affidavit
the bank alleged article 1995 subdivision 5(a) as proper basis for venue.2

The trial court overruled the plea of privilege. Hopkins appealed, contending that subdivision 5(a) was not applicable because his guaranty contract

did not expressly name a place for performance. The court of civil appeals

affirmed. 3 On Hopkins' application for writ of error, the Texas Supreme
Court, in a per curiam opinion, refused the application by finding no
reversible error.' Held-Writ refused n.r.e. If a promissory note expressly
states that it is payable in a certain place, venue is sustainable in that
place against one who has absolutely and unconditionally guaranteed its
payment.'

The basic venue rule in Texas gives a defendant a privilege to be, sued
in the county of his domicile.' A statutory exception for contracting parties,

has been present since the first venue statute was enacted in 1836.8 Under
subdivision 5(a) contracting parties have a limited right to agree upon
venue.' When the defendant has contracted in writing to perform an obligation in a county other than his domicile naming that county expressly,
or stating a definite place within that county, the plaintiff may bring suit
there or in the county of the defendant's'domicile10 Although subdivision
Supp. 1976-1977) states:
2. TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 5(a) (Vernon
Subject to the provisions of Subsection (b), if a person has contracted in writing to
perform an obligation in a particular county, expressly naming such county, or a
definite place therein, by such writing, suit upon or by reason of such obligation may
be brought against him, either in such county or where the defendant has his domicile.
Subdivision 5(b) excepts consumer transactions from the 5(a) venue exception. Id. § 5(b).
3. Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 546 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1976),
writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 551 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1977).
4. Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 551 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1977) (refusing writ n.r.e. per
curiam).
5. Id. at 345. The words "absolute," "unconditional" and "guaranty of payment" are
often used interchangeably. See, e.g., Estes v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 421 S.W.2d
158, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ) (guaranty of payment absolute not conditional guaranty); Austin v. Guaranty State Bank, 300 S.W. 129, 132 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1927, no writ) (guaranty of payment is "absolute, that is, an unconditional undertaking");
El Paso Bank & Trust Co. v. First State Bank, 202 S.W. 522, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1918, no writ) (guaranty of payment without words of condition is absolute guaranty).
6. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964). The Texas statute was drawn from
Spanish law which favored the convenience of the defendant. See McKnight, The Spanish
Influence on the Texas Law of Civil Procedure, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 24, 40 (1959) (discussing
Richardson v. Wells, 3 Tex. 223 (1848)).
7. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 1995, § 5(a) (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977) is the present
form of the exception for written contracts.
8. Texas' first venue statute, with ten exceptions, was enacted in 1836 in the Congress
of the Republic. See 1836 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act Establishing the Jurisdiction and Powers
of the District Courts § 5, at 200, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAws OF TEXAS 1260 (1898).
9. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 477 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Tex. 1972). The fixing of
venue by contract, except as permitted by the statutory exception, is invalid. Id. at 537.
10. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 5(a) (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977). The original
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5(a) has been the subject of much appellate litigation," it is well settled
that when a contracting party is sued for payment the designation of a
specific place for payment in the contract is sufficient to sustain venue in
the county of the place so named. 2 A central issue in a long line of civil
appeals cases had been the applicability of subdivision 5(a) to written
guaranty contracts.'" If neither the principal contract nor the guaranty
contract names a place for payment, subdivision 5(a) will not be applicable." If the guaranty itself specifies a place for performance, suit may be
brought against the guarantor in that county. 5 But where the principal
exception did not require a contract in writing. See 1836 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act Establishing
the Jurisdiction and Powers of the District Courts § 5, at 200, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS
1260 (1898). By 1935 a written contract was required and in that year the exception was
altered to read that the contract must name "expressly" the county in which the obligation
is to be performed or a "definite place therein ....
" 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 213, § 1, at
503. The 1935 amendment is discussed in Saigh v. Monteith, 147 Tex. 341, 344-45, 215 S.W.2d
610, 611-12 (1948). In Saigh a written lease provided for payments to be made to a particular
bank. The lessor sued in the county where the bank was located but venue was not sustainable
there because the lessee had not expressly named that county or a definite place therein. Id.
at 344-45, 215 S.W.2d at 611-12. For cases following the rule that venue may not be fixed by
implication see Burtis v. Butler Bros., 148 Tex. 543, 549, 226 S.W.2d 825, 828 (1950); Martin
v. Allen, 494 S.W.2d 585, 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ); Annot., 97
A.L.R.2d 934 (1964).
11. See Sampson, Distant Forum Abuse in Consumer Transactions: A Proposed
Solution, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 269, 270-72 (1973) (interesting discussion of venue litigation in
Texas).
12. See, e.g., Thompson v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 388 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Tex. 1965)
(refusing writ n.r.e. per curiam) (note payable "in Austin" was contract in writing performable in Travis County for purpose of subdivision 5); Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Allen, 160 Tex.
258, 259, 328 S.W.2d 866, 867 (1959) (note payable at plaintiff's office "in Amarillo, Potter
County, Texas" sufficient to fix venue in Potter County); Burtis v. Butler Bros., 148 Tex.
543, 548, 226 S.W.2d 825, 829 (1950) (words "all bills payable in Dallas" in financial statement sufficient to fix venue in Dallas County).
13. See, e.g., Rost v. First Nat'l Bank, 472 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1971, no writ); Cullum v. Commercial Credit Co., 134 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1939, no writ); McCauley v. Cross, 111 S.W. 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ). When the
principal debtor and the guarantor are joined, the plaintiff may also allege subdivision 4
(defendants in different counties) or 29a (two or more defendants) to sustain venue against
the guarantor. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 1995, §§ 4, 29a (Vernon 1964). When the
principal is a resident of the county of suit, his guarantor is a "proper party" and subdivision
4 applies. Storrs-Schaefer Co. v. Shelton, 82 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1935,
no writ). When venue is sustainable against the principal under another exception, however,
his guarantor is not a "necessary party" for purposes of subdivision 29a. Kids Kounty Klothing, Inc. v. Lachman-Rose Co., 546 S.W.2d 381, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, no
writ).
14. Prewitt v. First Nat'l Bank, 491 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no
writ) (note payable "at office of said Bank" insufficient to establish venue against maker or
guarantor in county where bank located); Dina Pak Corp. v. May Aluminum, Inc., 417
S.W.2d 419, 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, no writ) (neither purchaser nor guarantor contracted in writing to perform obligation in county of suit).
15. Mahler v. J.R. Watkins Co., 120 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1938, no
writ); J.R. Watkins Co. v. Webb, 97 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1936, no writ).
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contract names a place for payment and the guaranty contains no such
provision, a question is raised whether venue is fixed against the guarantor
in the county where the principal agreed to pay. The courts have been
willing to answer this question affirmatively when the guaranty contains
language which incorporates the terms of the principal contract.1' When
the guaranty lacks incorporation language, however, the courts have
reached conflicting results" which reflect differing concepts about the nature and extent of a guarantor's liability. 8
In recent years concepts about guarantors have been influenced by the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Article 3, which embodies the law of
negotiable instruments, contains provisions dealing with "sureties" of negotiable instruments.' 9 "Surety" is used in a broad generic sense; thus a
guarantor specifically governed by section 3.416" is a type of surety."
In both cases a written guaranty providing for performance at Winona, Minnesota or Dallas
was held to meet the requirements of subdivision 5.
16. See Loveless v. Texas First Mortgage R.E.I.T., 531 S.W.2d 870, 872-73 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd) (guaranty payable "at the place specified in
the note"); Marco Milling Co. v. Commercial Servs., Inc., 346 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ) (guaranty of contract in accordance with its terms); Cullum
v. Commercial Credit Co., 134 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1939, no writ)
(guaranty provided for payment "as the same shall become due and payable"); Tayloe v.
Federal Land Bank, 120 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1938, no writ) (guaranty of note "according to the terms thereof"').
17. For cases sustaining venue against the guarantor without express words of incorporation see Hinn v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 495 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1973, no writ); Rost v. First Nat'l Bank, 472 S.W.2d 579, 581-82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1971, no writ); Carter v. Texas State Bank, 189 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1945, no writ); Citizens' State Bank v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co.,
268 S.W. 1008, 1009 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925, no writ); McCauley v. Cross, 111
S.W. 790, 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ). Contra, Smith v. First Nat'l Bank, 146 S.W.2d
270, 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1940, no writ); Storrs-Schaefer Co. v. Shelton, 82 S.W.2d
156, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1935, no writ).
18. Compare Smith v. First Nat'l Bank, 146 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1940, no writ) (emphasized separate nature of guarantor's undertaking in holding that venue
established by note not sustainable against guarantor) with Cullum v. Commercial Credit
Co., 134 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1939, no writ) (stressed fact that extent
of guarantor's liability is measured by that of principal in holding that venue provisions in
note fixed venue against guarantor).
19. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.416 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Sureties under
article 3 include indorsers, accommodation parties and guarantors. See Peters, Suretyship
Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 833, 836-40 (1968). See
generally Clark, Suretyship in the Uniform Commercial Code, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 453, 455-57
(1968).
20. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.416 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) states:
(a) "Payment guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a signature mean that the
signer engages that if the instrument is not paid when due he will pay it according to
its tenor without resort by the holder to any other party.
(b) "Collection guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a signature mean that the
signer engages that if the instrument is not paid when due he will pay it according to
its tenor, but only after the holder has reduced his claim against the maker or acceptor
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Section 3.416 provides for two kinds of guarantors who are distinguished
by the form of their signing. A guarantor of payment may be required to
pay when the instrument matures, but a guarantor of collection is generally not liable until the claim against the maker or acceptor has been
reduced to judgment and returned unsatisfied." The effect of section 3.416
is becoming apparent in Texas cases. In these cases, section 3.416 has
influenced procedural rights of guarantors as well as substantive guaranty
principles. 3 Citing section 3.416, the Texas Supreme Court recently held
in Universal Metals & Machinery, Inc. v. Bohart"' that a guarantor of
payment is primarily liable and can be sued without joining the maker of
the note.21
The UCC concept of a guarantor's liability was again discussed by the
Texas Supreme Court in Hopkins v. FirstNational Bank.' The court made
it clear that despite his primary liability, a guarantor can be bound by
venue provisions set out by the maker of a promissory note.27 The court
stated that in one sense a guaranty of payment and a note are separate
undertakings-due to the primary nature of the guarantor's liability he can
be sued apart from the maker." Nevertheless, the court reasoned that in
another sense they are not separate-when considering the extent of liability, the terms of the note must be examined to ascertain the guarantor's
to judgment and execution has been returned unsatisfied, or after the maker or acceptor has become insolvent or it is otherwise apparent that it is useless to proceed against
him.
21. "'Surety' includes guarantor." TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(40) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968). "Surety" in the UCC sense should be distinguished from "surety" as
used in a narrow pre-code sense. See Wood v. Canfield Paper Co., 117 Tex. 399, 406, 5 S.W.2d
748, 750 (1928) ("substantial differences" between a guaranty and surety).
22. Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J.
833, 840 (1968). This terminology is not new. Long before the code was enacted it was held
that the distinction between a guaranty of payment and a guaranty of collection is that in
the former the creditor may on default proceed directly against the guarantor without taking
steps to collect from the principal. Ganado Land Co. v. Smith, 290 S.W. 920, 923 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1927, writ ref'd).
23. See Universal Metals & Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874, 877, 879 (Tex. 1976)
(guarantor of payment liable even though maker's signature is forged; usury no defense);
Knick v. Green, 545 S.W.2d 269, 272 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (guarantor
of payment liable as original obligor and notice of default not required). Bohart and Hopkins
have influenced procedural rights of guarantors. See Cohen, Jurisdictionaland Procedural
Aspects of Securing Judgments Against PartiesSecondarily Liable-A Proposalfor Reform,
9 ST. MARY's L.J. 245, 253 n.46 (1977).
24. 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976).
25. Id. at 877. By executing a guaranty of payment a guarantor waives any requirement
that the holder of the note take action against the maker as a condition precedent to his
liability. Id. at 877.
26. 551 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1977) (refusing writ n.r.e. per curiam).
27. Id. at 345.
28. Id. at 345.
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obligations. n Citing section 3.416, the court held that one who absolutely
and unconditionally guarantees payment of a note thereby agrees to pay
the note according to its terms if the maker defaults.3 Consequently, if a
note expressly designates a place for payment, the contract of guaranty
must also be said to expressly provide for performance at a definite place."
The Texas Supreme Court took jurisdiction in Hopkins because of a
conflict with Smith v. First National Bank,3" a decision which was expressly disapproved in the per curiam opinion. Smith was a suit against
the maker and guarantor of promissory notes. Although the guaranty contract did not name a place for performance, the notes were payable in
Trinity County, Texas. The guarantor's plea of privilege to be sued in the
county of his domicile was sustained with the court reasoning that the
notes and the guaranty were "separate and distinct." The Smith court
cited a number of decisions to support this holding.'" Several of these
decisions, however, are distinguishable, involving suits against sureties or
M "Surety"
indemnifiers rather than guarantors3
in this context is used in
a narrow pre-code sense.m The courts have consistently held that when a
surety contract does not name a place for performance, venue cannot be
sustained against the surety on the basis of a place named in the principal
contract." A corresponding rule applies to indemnifiers.18
29. Id. at 345.
30. Id. at 345.
31. Id. at 345. The Hopkins rule should be applicable to guarantors of collection as well
as guarantors of payment. A guarantor of collection is a "conditional" guarantor. See Estes
v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 421 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ)
(conditional guaranty merely guarantees collection). The circumstances leading up to his
actual liability differ, yet, once liable, he too is bound by the note "according to its tenor."
TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Thus, he should be
bound by venue provisions in the note.
32. 146 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1940, no writ).
33. Id. at 273.
34. Id. at 273.
35. Eleven cases were cited but only one dealt directly with the applicability of the
contract exception to a guaranty. Five dealt with the applicability of the contract exception
to surety or indemnity contracts. The Smith court did not distinguish these cases. See Smith
v. First Nat'l Bank, 146 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1940, no writ).
36. The word surety is often used in a narrow sense to indicate a primary obligation to
pay another's debt to distinguish it from the secondary obligation of a guarantor. L. SiMPSON,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF StmarsMr § 5 (1950). Surety is also used in the broad sense to
include both technical surety and guarantor. Id. § 4.
37. See, e.g., Lindheim v. Muschamp, 72 Tex. 33, 35, 12 S.W. 125,126 (1888); Panhandle
Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Whitlow, 359 S.W.2d 146, 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1962, no
writ); Employers' Cas. Co. v. Win. Cameron & Co., 288 S.W. 584, 585 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1926, no writ). These were all suits against sureties on contract bonds. Like
the cases discussing the applicability of subdivision 5(a) to a guaranty, the nature of a surety's
obligation has been a decisive factor. In a frequently cited case the court reasoned that
"[tJhe engagement . . . to construct the building was one contract, and the bond was
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In light of Bohart, which held that guarantors of payment may be sued
apart from the maker of a note, it might have been reasonable to infer that
when the venue issue arises, these guarantors should be treated as sureties." The Hopkins court apparently anticipated the potential incongruity
between its decision and Bohart by stating that due to the primary nature
of the guarantor's liability his contract is separate from the note in one
sense, but that because the extent of his liability is determined by the
terms of the note, his contract is not separate in another sense.' Consequently, when venue is established by the terms of the note, it is sustainable against one who has guaranteed its payment.'
The Smith court had also reasoned that the guaranty contract and the
notes were "without any intrinsically-stated mutuality of obligation."'"
Hopkins pointed out that his guaranty made no express reference to the
terms of the note and, relying on Smith and other cases, contended that
in order for a guarantor to be bound by venue provisions in a note, express
"incorporation language" was necessary. 3 Indeed, in many of the cases
which held venue to be fixed against a guarantor by a place for payment
named in the principal contract, the guaranty had contained words of
incorporation." The holding in Hopkins, however, suggests that the absence of such words is immaterial because under section 3.416 an unconditional guaranty includes the terms of the note.'" A guaranty of payment,
Lindheim v. Muschamp, 72 Tex. 33, 35, 12 S.W.
another, each separate and distinct.
125, 126 (1888).
38. See Stribling v. American Sur. Co., 41 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1941, no writ). For a case distinguishing guarantors and indemnifiers see Olson v. Smith, 72
S.W.2d 650, 652 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1934, writ dism'd).
39. When a guarantor's liability is treated as primary, the pre-code distinction between
a surety and guarantor is blurred. Cook v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 538 S.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ); see National City Bank v. Taylor, 293 S.W. 613, 618
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1927, no writ) (surety contract is primary and direct while
guaranty is collateral and secondary); Ganado Land Co. v. Smith, 290 S.W. 920, 923 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston 1927, writ ref'd) (guarantor who was primarily liable was "not less than
a surety").
40. Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 551 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1977) (refusing writ n.r.e.
per curiam).
41. Id. at 345.
42. Smith v. First Nat'l Bank, 146 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1940,
no writ).
43. Brief for Appellant at 9, Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 546 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1976).
44. See cases cited note 16 supra. But see Carter v. Texas State Bank, 189 S.W.2d 782,
784 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1945, no writ) (guaranty did not refer to notes, but import
of its terms was to name county of performance); Citizens' State Bank v. Commonwealth
Bank & Trust Co., 268 S.W. 1008, 1009 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925, no writ) (guaranty lacking words of incorporation was promise to pay "according to the tenor and terms of
the note itself").
45. Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 551 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1977) (refusing writ n.r.e.
per curiam); see Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. art. 3.416 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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even one lacking such words as "according to its terms," is sufficient to
bind the guarantor to venue provisions in the note.'1
The Texas Supreme Court's use of the code in Hopkins is a departure
from prior cases dealing with the guarantor-venue issue.' 7 Both Hopkins
and Bohart indicate that section 3.416 will have a pervasive effect on laws
governing guarantors, yet it is unclear from these decisions what types of
guaranties will fall within its scope. Guaranty agreements may take various forms and guaranties are not limited to promissory notes.,8 Section
3.416, however, speaks only of negotiable instruments. 9 In fact, section
3.416 seems to contemplate that all guaranties will be in the form of an
additional signature on the instrument itself with words that indicate a
special statusM Thus, in a technical sense, the applicability of section
3.416 to Hopkins' separate guaranty contract is questionable. At least two
courts have refused to apply the code in similar situations, 5 and the dis46. Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 551 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1977) (refusing writ n.r.e.
per curiam).
47. Prior courts reaching the same result as Hopkins had based their reasoning upon the
presence of words of incorporation or the coextensiveness of a guarantor's liability. See Cullum v. Commerical Credit Co., 134 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1939, no writ)
(words of incorporation); Citizens' State Bank v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co., 268 S.W.
1008, 1009 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925, no writ) (coextensive liability). The court of
civil appeals in Hopkins did not use section 3.416 but did cite Laukhuf v. Associates Discount
Corp., 443 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no writ) which was the first Texas case
to apply the code for purposes of subdivision 5(a). Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 546 S.W.2d
84, 87 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 551 S.W.2d 343
(Tex. 1977). Laukhuf was a suit against persons who had indorsed notes "with recourse." The
court cited section 3.414, which deals with indorsements, and held that the indorsements
constituted an express agreement to pay in accordance with the terms of the note. Laukhof
v. Associates Discount Corp., 443 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no writ).
48. A guarantor is "answerable for the payment of some debt or the performance of some
contract or duty" of another. Wood v. Canfield Paper Co., 117 Tex. 399, 404, 5 S.W.2d 748,
749 (1928).
49. Section 3.416 refers to "instruments .... Instrument' means a negotiable instrument." TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.102 (a)(5) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Section
3.104(a) sets out the requirements of a negotiable instrument and in section 3.104(b) writings
which meet these requirements are classified into drafts, checks, certificates of deposit and
notes. Id. §§ 3.104(a), .104(b).
50. The comment under section 3.416 explains the liability of a guarantor of payment,
referring to him as an "indorser who guarantees payment.
... Tzx. Bus. & COMM. CODE
ANN. § 3.416, comment (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). An indorsement must be written on the
instrument or on a paper firmly affixed thereto. Id. § 3.202(b).
51. See Fewox v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 249 So. 2d 55, 57 (Fla. 1971); Eikel v.
Bristow Corp., 529 S.W.2d 795, 799-800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
In Eikel a bank sued on three notes executed in 1967 and on two separate guaranty contracts
executed in 1965 and 1967. In refusing to apply section 3.416 to the guaranty contracts, the
court noted that "[slection 3.416 deals with guarantee agreements which are added to a
signature on the instrument." Eikel v. Bristow Corp., 529 S.W.2d 795, 800 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ). In Fewox the defendants had written a letter
which guaranteed payment of outstanding or future loans to a corporation. The Florida court
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senting justice in Bohart felt that even that form of guaranty, which was

a clause executed below the maker's signature on the note, was outside the

scope of section 3.416. 2 Hopkins, however, indicates that a guaranty of a
note in the form of a separate writing may fall within section 3.416.11
Regardless of its form, a guaranty clearly is beyond the scope of section
3.416 when the principal contract is not "commercial paper."54 At least two
cases decided before Hopkins which dealt with the guarantor-venue issue,
involved guarantors for contracts other than promissory notes. ' 5 Logically,
the Hopkins rule should extend to any guaranty without regard to the
limited scope of section 3.416.- Moreover, long before the UCC, a guarantor's liability was said to be measured by that of his principal, even for
venue purposes, unless the guaranty specified otherwise.57 As a result, if
the underlying contract expressly names a place for performance, venue
should be sustainable in that place against a guarantor whose own contract
does not name a place for performance.
There is another possible limitation not presented to the court in
Hopkins. When the contract underlying the guaranty, whether it be a note
or any other type of contract, is a consumer transaction, the effect of
subdivision 5(b) of article 1995 must be considered. Subdivision 5(b),
added in 1973, excludes consumer transactions from 5(a); a consumer may
refused to apply the code to the letter, stating that section 3.416(a) requires a signature on a
negotiable instrument. Fewox v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 249 So. 2d 55, 57 (Fla. 1971).
52. Universal Metals & Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874, 880-81 (Tex. 1976)
(Steakley, J., dissenting).
53. Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 551 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1977) (refusing writ n.r.e.
per curiam). It should be noted that Hopkins' guaranty was executed "at or about" the time
of the original note. Furthermore, the note stated that it was "secured by Guaranty of
Burtram C. Hopkins II." Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 546 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1976), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 551 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1977).
54. Article 3 deals exclusively with the regulation of negotiable instruments as defined
in section 3.104 and instruments "otherwise negotiable" as defined in section 3.805. TEX. Bus.
& COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.103, comment 1 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
55. See Marco Milling Co. v. Commercial Servs., Inc., 346 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ) (guarantors of accounts receivable agreement); Farmers'
& Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Lillard Milling Co., 210 S.W. 260, 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1919, no writ) (alleged guarantors of purchase contract).
56. The use of section 3.416 could be viewed as a buttress for the Hopkins rule. A recent
case citing Hopkins involved guarantors of a promissory note. In holding that the guarantors
were subject to venue at a place named in the note, no mention was made of section 3.416 or
whether the form of the guaranties complied with that section. Bridewell Dev. Corp. v.
American Gen. Inv. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 824, 825-26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1977, no writ).
57. Cullum v. Commerical Credit Co., 134 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1939, no writ); McCauley v. Cross, 111 S.W. 790, 791-92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ). In
both cases the court relied on the rule of coextensive liability in holding a guarantor subject
to suit in a place where the note was payable. See Citizens' State Bank v. Commonwealth
Bank & Trust Co., 268 S.W. 1008, 1009 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925, no writ).
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be sued only in the county where he signed his contract or where he lives."8
While many guaranty agreements are clearly for commercial purposes, a
guarantor's undertaking may encompass a personal loan or retail purchase.59 Hopkins leaves open the applicability of subdivision 5(b) when a
guarantor for a consumer is sued. 0
Although a guarantor is sometimes described as a "favorite of the law,"'"
a guaranty can be a trap for the unwary. Every guarantor assents to a
guaranty relationship fully expecting that the principal debtor will meet
his own obligations. Compounding the guarantor's surprise when his principal defaults is the surprise he may encounter if he is sued before any
litigation is brought against the principal in a place where he may never
have expected to be sued. Obviously a potential guarantor needs a way to
assess the risks involved. Since the UCC professes to modernize and clarify
commercial law 2 and article 3 contains a provision governing guarantors,
the inclination may be to look to article 3 for guidance. Yet the proper
relationship between negotiable instruments law and general guaranty
principles is not well defined. 3 Furthermore, not all guaranty agreements
58.. In1973 subdivision 5 became subdivision 5(a); subdivision 5(b) was added. TEx. REv.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977) states:

In an action founded upon a contractual obligation of the defendant to pay money
arising out of or based upon a consumer transaction for goods, services, loans, or
extensions of credit intended primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural
use, suit by a creditor upon or by reason of such obligation may be brought against
the defendant either in the county in which the defendant in fact signed the contract,
or in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of
the action. No term or statement contained in an obligation described in this subsection shall constitute a waiver of this provision.
The reason for this amendment was to prevent "distant forum abuse" when consumers are
sued by their creditors. Amaya v. Texas Sec. Corp., 527 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1975, writ refd n.r.e.), noted in 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 219, 221 (1976); see
Sampson, Distant Forum Abuse in Consumer Transactions:A Proposed Solution, 51 TEXAs
L. REv. 269 (1973). Subdivision 5(b) is said to be a result of this article. Amaya v. Texas Sec.
Corp., 527 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
59. Recent decisions indicate that subdivision 5(b) will be liberally construed. Cf.
Amaya v. Texas Sec. Corp., 527 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (street improvements on property adjoining a residence were consumer transaction); Beef Cattle Co. v. N.K. Parrish, Inc., 553 S.W.2d 220, 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1977, no writ) (purchase of over a million pounds of milo by cattle corporation was consumer
transaction).
60. Presumably Hopkins' guaranty was for loans of a commercial nature. The applicability of subdivision 5(b) was not discussed. See Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 551 S.W.2d 343,
345 (Tex. 1977) (refusing writ n.r.e. per curiam).
61. McKnight v. Virginia Mirror Co., 463 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. 1971); Southwest Say.
Ass'n v. Dunagan, 392 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
62. See TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.102(2)(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
63. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 13-12, at 427 n.98 (1972); Peters, Suretyship UnderArticle 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 833, 836, 876-79 (1968).
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fall within the scope of section 3.416.1'
Nevertheless, Hopkins appears to settle the guarantor-venue issue. The
limited scope of section 3.416 does not necessarily confine the Hopkins
decision because Hopkins is consistent with principles apart from the code.
Subdivision 5(a) gives contracting parties a right to agree upon venue by
bargaining over a place for performance. A 1935 amendment which prevents venue from being sustained by implication and the 1973 revision
which excludes consumer transactions were intended to ensure that no
contract will contain a venue provision when surprise and hardship to the
defendant will result." The idea that a guarantor's liability is measured
by that of his principal, unless the guaranty specifies otherwise, was established long before section 3.416.11 Arguably, being subject to venue in a
county other than one's domicile is not a "liability" in the same sense as
an amount due or a time or place for performance. Even so, the courts have
managed to reach a logically satisfying result by first referring to the principal contract to find the guarantor liable to pay at a given place. Then,
according to subdivision 5(a) he is subject to venue there. 7 Perhaps the
simplest, most direct approach would be to consider first whether there is
a venue provision sufficient against the principal and if there is, to regard
the guarantor as subject to that provision. Of course, if a guarantor has the
foresight to name a place for performance in his own contract a venue
provision in the principal contract should be immaterial.
Ann C. Livingston
64. Section 3.416 seems to contemplate a guaranty written on a negotiable instrument.
TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.416 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); see notes 49 and 50 supra.
65. Saigh v. Monteigh, 147 Tex. 341, 344, 215 S.W.2d 610, 611 (1948) (1935 amendment);
Amaya v. Texas Sec. Corp., 527 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.- San Antonio 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (1973 revision). A number of other states have a contract exception to their venue
statutes which allows suit to be brought in the county of performance. See Annot., 97
A.L.R.2d 934, 937 (1964). In some states venue can be fixed by implication. Id. at 942; see
Skaggs-Stone, Inc. v. Batt, 5 Cal. Rptr. 882, 883 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (guarantor's motion
for change of venue unsuccessful for several reasons including fact that guaranty contract
could be interpreted to provide for performance in county of suit).
66. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
67. Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 551 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1977) (refusing writ n.r.e.
per curiam); Citizens' State Bank v. Commonwealth Bank &Trust Co., 268 S.W. 1008,
1009 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925, no writ).
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